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Introduction
Until comparatively recently the general public held the medical
profession in high esteem, according the consultant an almost godlike status.
Adult patients in almost all cases respected the professional advice of the
medical team treating them and consented to any treatment recommended,
acknowledging that the doctor was the best person to advise them as to what
treatment was in their best interests. This was regardless ofthe fact they had
the right to reject the doctor's advice and refuse the medical treatment offered
even if the refusal might prove to be detrimental to their well-being.
More recently, however, patients have begun to exercise their
fundamental human right of self-determination and have started to question
the doctor's advice, and have gone on to refuse treatment. When this conflict
has occurred, the doctors have endeavoured to resolve it by obtaining legal
sanctions from the courts to overcome this refusal and to enable them to carry
out the medical procedure.
There have been a plethora of cases which have looked at the
relationship between the patient, doctor and the courts over the issue of
consent to medical treatment. Clearly, there has been a dramatic change in
the attitude of patients towards their doctor. But why this sudden change?
What has prompted patients to request a fuller explanation before reaching
their decision whether or not to consent to treatment?
One possible influence has been the Patients Charter, which was
published by the Government in 1992. It sets out what rights every citizen
has with regards to the services expected from the National Health Service.
One of these rights is "to be given a clear explanation of any treatment
proposed, including any risks and alternatives, before you decide whether
you will agree to the treatment."]
I Patients Charter (1992), p.9.
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Another possible factor was the Cumberledge Report, Changing
Childbirth, published in 1993.2 That Report radically changed the provision
ofmaternity services. Its main recommendations were that maternity services
should be women-centred, accessible, effective and efficient. Central to the
main thrust of the recommendations were patients' choice and patients'
autonomy. Women could choose not only their place ofconfinement but also
the professional personnel to carry out the care.
Both the Patients Charter and Changing Childbirth appear to have
dramatically altered the attitude ofpatients to the provision ofcare although
they have not given patients any additional legally enforceable rights.
However, the basic principles expressed in those two documents took a
battering in 1992 when a mother, supported by her husband, refused to have a
caesarean section on religious grounds. For the first time a court in the
United Kingdom ("UK") ruled that a caesarean section could lawfully be
performed despite the woman's refusal to give consent. As the case was the
first of its kind in this country, the court looked for guidance from the United
States of America where the courts had, for many years, authorised
interventions on pregnant women in order to save the lives of their babies.
This case, although much criticised, has been followed by further cases in
which a woman's refusal to give consent has been overridden by a court
order which has enabled the doctors to carry out the operation against the
woman's wishes in order to save the unborn child. Clearly the dilemma for
the medical team and the courts is the fact that the pregnant woman's refusal
to undergo treatment has major implications for the fetus. It is this highly
emotive aspect that has swayed the decision in favour ofsaving the fetus, and
exacerbated the problem.
Although the law appears to be clear regarding refusal oftreatment by a
competent adult, these cases highlight that there are still areas in this field
that have yet to be settled by the courts and Parliament. One such area is
whether the rights ofa mother refusing to have treatment must prevail against
those of her unborn child. Although UK law at present does not afford the
fetus any legal rights, a potential limit to the absolute right of a competent
adult to accept or reject treatment was recognised by Lord Donaldson MR in
Re T (adult: refusal oftreatment).3 He acknowledged the possibility that, ifa
2 Department of Health, Changing Childbirth, Report of the Expert Maternity Group, chaired by Baroness
Cumberledge (HMSO, 1993).
3 (1992] 4 All ER 649 (CA).
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woman's choice to reject treatment was to lead to the death ofa viable fetus,
her absolute right to choose may be curtailed.
The issue of consent or lack of it has become the attention of much
media coverage particularly in the emotive area ofcourts ordering women to
undergo caesarean sections against their will. It is clearly important, not only
to lawyers but also, to the medical personnel involved in patients' care as
well as to the women concerned. This is especially so because in the
landmark case, St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S, R v Collins and
Others ex parte S (1998),4 the Court ofAppeal declared that a hospital acted
unlawfully in forcing a pregnant woman to give birth by caesarean section
against her wishes.
There has been much written in the past on the subject ofconsent, with
a proliferation ofarticles in recent years on the topic ofthe rights ofpregnant
women to refuse to consent to caesarean section, etc. 5 This article aims to
contribute to the literature by looking at, inter alia, the rights of both the
mother and the unborn child (fetus), to which not much attention has so far
been given.
After the introductory section, it (a) focuses on the history and
background of the use of the caesarean section as a method of delivering a
baby, highlighting the main reasons for its use, from both the maternal and
fetal standpoints, and (b) explores how the law stands in relation to consent to
medical treatment for competent and incompetent adults, an issue which
requires identification of the situations in which a doctor can lawfully treat a
patient without consent and what happens if the patient refuses to give
consent. Particular reference is made throughout to pregnant women refusing
to consent to treatment. The paper also reviews the rights of the fetus from
the American and English law perspectives, noting how attempts have been
made to use those rights to override the rights of the mother, despite the fact
that UK law does not currently afford the fetus any rights. It is argued,
finally, that the present position regarding the caesarean section, women's
4 [1998] 3 All ER 673.
5 See, e.g., Kennedy and Grubb, Medical Law, 3'd ed. (Butterworths, 2000), Mason and McCall Smith, Medical
Law and Ethics (Butterworths LexixNexis, 2002); R. Francis, "Compulsory Caesarean Section: and English
perspective", Journal a/Contemporary Health Law and Policy, Spring 1998, v.14, n.2, pp. 365-89; J. Herring,
"Caesarean section, phobias and fetal rights", Cambridge Law Journal, Nov. 1997, v.56, n.3, pp.509-511; B.
Hewson, "Ethical triumph or surgical rape? (Court-Ordered Caesarean Section, United Kingdom)", Solicitors'
Journal, Nov. 26,1993, v. 137, n.45, p. 1182; N. Rhoden, "The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of
Court-ordered Caesarean Sections", California Law Review, Dec. 1986, n.6, pp. 1951-2030; and R. Scott,
"Maternal Duties Toward the Unborn? Soundings from the Law ofTort", Medical Law Review, v. 8, no.l, Spring
2000, pp. 1-68.
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rights and the rights of the fetus requires Parliamentary intervention.
History and development ofthe caesarean section6
Nature has devised an almost fail-safe birthing process which enables a
baby to be born alive and well. However, when a problem occurs in this
birthing process which may endanger the lives of both the mother and the
baby or the life of one of them, the medical team can intervene by using the
operation of caesarean section to deliver the baby safely.
This part looks at the development of the caesarean operation in its
historical context and briefly explores the principal reasons for its use from
the standpoint of both the mother and the fetus. It also investigates and
discusses some of the major factors that have influenced the operation's
increased use. Although today the operation is considered by many to be one
ofthe safest operations performed, there are still some inherent risks involved
to both mother and baby, which will also be explored.
Brief history of the caesarean section7
The birthing process has worked for centuries, with each stage of the
process having a distinct purpose and specific goal. So far as most women
are concerned, the delivery process is a unique and wonderful experience,
which generally works extremely well, requiring little or no outside
assistance. However, when a problem occurs in this birthing process, which
may endanger both the mother and the baby, the obstetricians8 have a variety
of procedures available to them, which enables them to correct the problem
and assist nature. One such procedure is the operation of caesarean section.
The operation has been carried out for centuries, with there being some
evidence that it might have been known by the ancient Egyptians.9 There are
a number of theories as to where the name caesarean originated from.
Legend has it that Julius Caesar was delivered by caesarean section and that
6 Incision of the uterus (womb) in order to deliver the baby abdominally, as opposed to the normal vaginal TOute.
7 For a more detailed history, see Caesarean Birth in Britain (Middlesex University Press: London, 1993).
8 Doctors specialising in maternity care.
9 J.B. Delee, Principles and Practice aJObstetrics (W.B. Saunders: London, 1913).
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the procedure was named after him. 1O Some believe that the name is more
likely to come from the 'lex caearia' in Roman law, which required that
abdominal surgery be performed on a dead or dying woman in the latter part
ofher pregnancy in order for the baby to be buried separately.!! However, a
more plausible theory is that the name comes from the Latin word, "cedre,"
which means to cut, and that "caesarean section" means literally to "cut
OUt.,,12
What is clear from early mythological references and ancient folklore is
that the surgical delivery has been practised for centuries. It was first
performed in order to provide a separate burial place for the fetus of a dead
woman, rather than to deliver a living baby from a dying mother in order to
save its life. It was not until the sixteenth century that surgery was performed
with the specific purpose of saving both the mother and baby.
The operation is, therefore, one ofthe oldest known surgical operations
and was originally carried out only as an emergency procedure on women,
who were either dying or who had just died during pregnancy or labour, in
the hope that the fetus might be extracted alive. Initially, it was performed
only as a last resort because it carried with it a great deal of risk. The main
principle ofobstetric practice was to avoid caesarean section ifat all possible
and, at any cost, every attempt was made to secure a vaginal delivery.
Development of breech extraction, the use offorceps applied to the baby's
head to aid delivery and the use of destructive operations on the fetus are
examples of procedures which were adopted in order to secure vaginal
delivery. However, with the advent ofsterile techniques, improved surgical
techniques and anaesthesia, coupled with the availability of blood and
antibiotics, the risks were greatly reduced. From being an extremely
dangerous operation, it has now become one of the safest of surgical
operations.
Reasons for its use
The greatly increased safety ofthe operation has, ofcourse, meant that
the indications for its use have widened, and the number of caesarean
operations has increased year by year. Because the medical team have a
10 1. Guillimeau, Childbirth (A. Hatfield: London, 1612), p.185.
11 F.S. Newell, Caesarean Section (D. Appleton: London, 1921), p. 2.
12 Delee, op. cit.
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reasonably safe alternative to vaginal delivery, they must now decide on a
case by case basis whether a vaginal delivery or an abdominal delivery will
be the safer option for the mother and her baby. Where there are no
complications, i.e., where both the mother and baby are well, there is no
doubt that vaginal delivery remains the safest method and should be the one
ofchoice. Where there are complications present, then the obstetrician must
taken them into account and balance the advantages and disadvantages ofthe
two modes of delivery.
So, on what occasions would a caesarean operation be absolutely
necessary? This part does not intend to include all possible reasons; it rather
includes only those reasons which the author considers are absolute
indications. These reasons can be subdivided into (a) maternal reasons, (b)
fetal reasons and (c) other reasons.
a) Maternal Reasons
Cephalopelvic disproportion
This occurs when there is disparity between the size of the fetal head
and the size of the maternal pelvis, in other words, when there is insufficient
room for the baby's head to pass through the bony pelvis. The most common
reason for this is that the baby's head is too large to pass through either
because the maternal pelvis is misshapen (due to illness or accident) or it is
too small. Women of short stature (under five feet) tend to have small bones
although nature compensates for this by producing a small baby. Or it might
be that the mother is of average size but the baby she is carrying is large or
lying in an awkward position making it difficult for the fetus to pass through
the birth canal.
Maternal Health Reasons
Some maternal conditions can also require, for the mother's own safety,
that a caesarean be carried out. High blood pressure is one such disease, the
mother may have been suffering from this before pregnancy or she may
develop it during the pregnancy. The blood pressure may remain
reasonably stable, in which case regular ante-natal check-ups and careful
monitoring ante-natally and during labour will be sufficient. However, it
may become excessively high, and a condition known as pre-eclampsia may
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be diagnosed. This is a specific disease occurring after the twentieth week of
pregnancy. 13 The condition can become so severe that the only cause of
action is to deliver the baby as the blood pressure usually improves after
delivery.
Occasionally other medical conditions, such as heart disease or diabetes
or previous history of a stroke, where an increase in the blood pressure may
occur due to the stresses of labour and pushing the baby out may be
dangerous, may lead the doctors to advise that a caesarean section be
performed.
Problems with the placenta
Normally the placenta is situated in the upper part of the womb.
However, occasionally, it will form lower down in the uterus and is known as
"placenta praevia." There are varying degrees of placenta praevia with the
possibility that the placenta may totally block the passage of the fetus, thus
making vaginal delivery impossible. An abnormally situated placenta can
also be the cause of heavy bleeding which can be life-threatening to the
mother. Another problem associated with the placenta is that it may suddenly
peel away from the wall of the womb, causing bleeding and pain (abruptio
placenta). The bleeding may only be slight, but it may also become heavy,
threatening the life of both mother and baby, and requiring an emergency
caesarean to save the two of them.
b) Fetal reasons
Fetal distress
This is a condition where the baby in the womb, for a variety of
reasons, is not receiving sufficient oxygen supplies. There are a number of
different causes. As already mentioned, one reason may be that the placenta,
for whatever reason, is not supplying enough oxygen. This could be due to
poor function or separation of the placenta itself.
Fetal distress can occur at any time throughout the pregnancy although
it is more likely to occur during labour. It is estimated that fetal distress in
13 See e.g., M.A. Hickman, An Introduction to Midwifery (Biling and Son Ltd.: London, 1978).
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labour occurs in about one birth in one hundred in hospital practice. 14 Ifthe
condition becomes acute, the baby may be left with some degree of brain
damage or may in fact die.
Fetal distress usually manifests itself in a number ofways: there may be
evidence such as abnormalities in the baby's heart rate; plus, there may be
evidence of fresh meconium, which is further evidence that the child is
suffering from a possible reduction in its oxygen supply. However, it can be
extremely difficult to diagnose whether the baby is truly distressed because
interpretation of the fetal heart recordings is notoriously difficult. Many
modem obstetric units now carry out fetal blood sampling, which enables
them to determine the baby's oxygen levels in order to decide whether or not
it is a false alarm. Research has suggested that in labour doubtful fetal heart
rate should be checked and confirmed by fetal blood sampling. 15
Small and occasionally large babies can run into problems, particularly,
during labour and delivery. However, smaller babies are more likely to do so
than big babies and, therefore, more likely to be delivered by caesarean.
Whilst one in fifteen babies are under 2.5 kg in weight, almost 60% (one in
fifteen) of the deaths are accorded to these babies. 16 Many of them are
delivered by caesarean for reasons such as fetal distress, heavy bleeding prior
to birth, etc.
Another reason put forward by the medical team for requiring a
caesarean section is breech presentation. This is when the baby's bottom is
14 National Institute of Health, 1982, p7.
15 I. Chalmers, M. Erskine and M.J.N.C. Keirse, Effective Care in Pregnancy and Childbirth (Oxford Press: Oxford,
1989). Unfortunately, although most, ifnot all, maternity units have electronic fetal monitoring equipment, 55% of
units in the U.K. in 1992 lacked fetal blood sampling equipment: Balen and Smith, The C. T G. in Practice
(Livingstone: London, 1992).
16 Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1990.
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presenting first instead of the normal cephalic (head) presentation. The
reason for this is that there are concerns that the bottom, being soft and
malleable, may pass though the birth canal but the larger part of the baby, the
head, may not. Before the 1970s it was common practice for obstetricians, on
finding such a presentation, to perform an "external cephalic version". This
procedure would tum a breech baby into the normal cephalic position.
However, this procedure was not without risk; the cord could become knotted
or the placenta damaged. These, coupled with the increasing safety of the
caesarean operation, led to a decline in the procedure. So, today, whenever
there is breech presentation, a caesarean section is recommended.
Other reasons
Repeat caesarean
In his original lecture on the subject of the caesarean section, Graigin
said that the medical profession should be cautious about performing a
caesarean on a woman having her first child. During this lecture he made his
most famous and remembered statement, "once a caesarean, always a
caesarean." That statement reflected the practice ofdoctors for many years,
particularly, in America. The medical profession's concern was that the scar
in the womb would come apart during labour. 17 The majority of doctors in
Britain do not hold that view and will allow a woman, who has had a
previous caesarean, to have a trial oflabour the next time round. Having said
that, those obstetricians would only be happy for that to happen if the mother
agrees to having the baby in a well-equipped unit.
Prolapsed cord
Another absolute reason for performing a caesarean would be a
prolapsed cord, which constitutes a grave risk to the fetus because of the
danger of reducing the baby's blood supply. A prolapsed cord can occur
when the waters rupture, when a sudden gush ofthe amniotic fluid may bring
the cord down with it. Other conditions that may predispose a cord prolapse
are a small baby, cephalopelvic disproportion (mentioned earlier) or, long
cord. Whatever the cause they all require immediate delivery of the fetus.
Factors influencing its increased use
17 C. Francome, W. Savage, H. Churchill and H. Lewison, Caesarean Birth in Britain (Middlesex University
Press: London, 1997).
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The rate of caesarean section has risen dramatically in almost all
countries ofthe western world over the last 20 years. IS There are a number of
factors that have increased the use of caesarean section in this country and
throughout the world. Probably the most important reason cited for the
increased use ofthe operation is the fear oflitigation. It is suggested that this
fear has played a key role in increased rates in the U.K. and U.S.A. 19
Changing methods of obstetric practice is another influential factor.
Changing attitudes ofdoctors towards delivery clearly play an important role.
The dictum, "once a caesarean always a caesarean," maintained, particularly
in America, high levels ofoperative intervention. However, obstetricians are
now not following the dictum quite so rigidly. Training and experience of
obstetricians also arguably play their part. As the indications and reasons for
the caesarean section increase, so the skills for carrying out alternative
procedures are lost. The art ofbreech delivery, mid cavity forceps delivery,
etc., are being eroded away, leaving no other choice but the caesarean.
Also, increased induction rates and the increased use of epidural
anaesthesia, coupled with the introduction of intra-partum care by midwives,
have contributed to the increased rates ofcaesarean section although this may
be disputed by some practitioners who feel that over the years rates have been
reduced by changes in practice and peer pressure.20
Another major factor in the increase is the introduction of patients'
choice. The introduction of the Patients Charter and Changing Childbirth
have led to an increase in patients participating in the management of their
care. Both documents actively encourage patients to take a more active role
in their treatment. Patients are no longer willing to merely accept what the
physician tells them. They increasingly question the management of their
care and treatment, and contribute to the decisions made.
Changing Childbirth places great emphasis on a woman's right to
choose. A woman's wishes may well be influential in the decision ofwhether
or not to have a caesarean section. The actual extent to which women's
demands influence the number ofoperations performed is undocumented.21 It
18 A.J. McFarlane and G. Chamberlain, "What is happening to Caesarean Section Rates?", The Lancet, 342, pp.105-
6.
"c. Noir, "Trends in Caesarean Section Deliveries in Canada", Health Rep, 3, pp. 203-15.
20 Savage and Francome, op. cit.
21 J. Lomas and M. Enkin, "Variations in operative delivery rates" , in I. Chalmers, M. Enkin and J.N.S. Keirse
(eds.), Effective Care in Pregnancy and Childbirth, vol.2 (Oxford Press, 1989), pp. 1181-1195.
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has been reported that direct requests for a caesarean section by women are
not complied with unless there is an underlying medical reason for operative
delivery.22 Arguably, very few doctors are likely to be so stubborn as to go
against their wishes for fear oflitigation should things go wrong.
However, the possible influence that women themselves may have on
the decision-making process is mentioned less frequently?3 It is,
nonetheless, an important factor in the rates of operative delivery, and also
extremely important to the women involved?4
A factor influencing the caesarean section in America, and possibly
increasingly in this country, is the effect of private care. In the USA the
majority of women are cared for by obstetricians in private practices?5 In
England the number of women being cared for privately is increasing and
with it rising intervention rates are resulting. Such patients believe that, if
they are paying, they should get what they want.
The rise in caesarean section rates
Over the years the rates of the caesarean section have been increasing
steadily.26 For example, in England, although the rate increased from 10% in
1988 to 13% in 1991,27 by 2000 it had risen to 21.3%, according to the Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.28
These increases give an indication that the obstetricians' ruling body,
the Royal College ofObstetricians and Gynaecologists, could be more active
in reducing such levels. Improved training and on-going assessment may
also help reduce rates. In fact a report, produced jointly by the Royal College
of Midwives and the Royal College of Gynaecologists in 1999,
acknowledged the need to have increased involvement of more senior
22 Johnson et ai, "Obstetric deciSion-making: response to patients who request caesarean delivery", Obstetrics and
Gynaecology, 1986, vol. 67, pp. 847-50.
23 McFarlane and Chamberlain, op. cit.
24 T.A.J. Mould, S. Chong, J. Spencer and S. Gallivan, "Women's involvement with the decision preceding their
caesarean section and their degree ofsatisfaction", British Journal o/Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Nov. 1996, vol.
103, pp. 1074-77.
25 National Institute of Health 1992.
26 See, e.g., McFarlane and Chamberlaine, op. cit.
27 House of Commons Official Report (Hansard), 1992.
28 See RCOG, The national Sentinel Caesarean Section Audit Report. Oct. 2001.
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doctors, e.g., consultant obstetricians, on labour wards in the care ofwomen
with complex or complicated pregnancies, and in the supervision and
education ofjunior medical staff.29
A further possible solution is the introduction of no-fault
compensation. This might serve to reduce the numbers of caesareans
performed because the obstetrician, who does not perform a caesarean section
on demand, would thereby no longer fear litigation.
It is, today, reassuring that the Government has announced that it
intends to clamp down on caesarean sections on demand and, instead, allow
the operation only on medical grounds.30
Whatever is done, the rates ofcaesarean must surely be lowered, ifnot
for this generation, for generations to come. Ifwe are not careful, we are in
danger of losing sight of what for nature is a normal process.
The following part considers the question of consent to treatment.
Adult patients and consent to treatment
One of the fundamental principles ofhealth care law is that treatment
should be given only with the patient's consent. The requirements that a
patient must give a valid consent to medical treatment and that it is the
patient's exclusive right to refuse treatment, even that which will save his
life, are issues at the heart of medical law.
As a general rule, medical treatment, even of a minor kind, cannot be
carried out legally unless the doctor has first obtained the patient's consent.
In the majority of cases adult patients respect the professional advice of the
doctors treating them and consent to any recommended medical treatment.
Increasingly, however, patients are questioning the advice given and are
refusing to give consent to the medical treatment offered?1
The law is clear: every adult has the right to decide whether or not to
accept treatment even if that refusal may cause them permanent damage.32
29 See Towards Safer Childbirth (RGOG Press, 1999). The report reconnnended, inter alia, that (a) all labour wards
should have a lead obstetrician responsible for daily management and staffdeployment, and the support ofmedical
staff, (b) at least one consultant or equivalent cover should be available in a supervisory capacity for 40 hours
during the working week, and (c) a consultant on call should visit the labour ward and conduct ward rounds and,
where difficult deliveries were anticipated, should be contacted.
30 See, e.g., Daily Mail, Feb. 28, 2004, p.5.
31 Re C (Adult; Refusal of Treatment) [1994] I W.L.R. 290.
32 Sidaway v Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital (1985) 2 W.L.R. 480.
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But, if there is any doubt regarding the patient's competence to make such a
decision, the decision may be challenged in a court oflaw. Even a pregnant
woman's right ofself-determination may be challenged ifher refusal is likely
to endanger the life ofher unborn baby, as was the position in Re S.33
This part explores how the law stands in relation to consent to medical
treatment for competent and incompetent adults, and the principles involved.
It will, in so doing, identify those situations in which the doctor can lawfully
treat without a patient's consent and problems which may arise ifhe does so,
with particular reference to pregnant women refusing to consent to caesarean
section.
Competent Adult
In order for a doctor to carry out legally any form ofmedical treatment
on a competent person, the doctor must first obtain the patient's consent. The
basis for requiring consent is that every person under the common law has the
right to have his/her bodily integrity protected against invasion by others.34
The principle was re-stated by Lord Donaldson in Re T: "Primafacie every
adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he will accept
medical treatment, even ifhis refusal may risk permanent injury to his health
or even lead to premature death ... However the presumption of capacity to
decide...is rebuttable. ,,35 Ifhe/she is touched without consent or other lawful
justification, then that individual has the right ofaction in the civil courts for
trespass to the person (battery).36 The fact that consent has been given will
normally prevent a successful claim for trespass although it may not prevent
an action for negligence.
Therefore, consent must be given before treatment begins; it may be
implied (by conduct) or express (in writing), but must be given freely by the
patient.37 Although there is no requirement for written consent to be
necessary in most cases,38 it is good practice to do so when reasonably
33 [1992] 4 All E.R. 671.
34 Sidaway v Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley HospitalJ1985) 2 W.L.R. 480.
35 [1993] Farn. Law 95.
36 See e.g., Cardozo, J. in SchloendorfJv Society ofNew York Hospital, 105 NE 92 (NY, 1914).
37 See e.g., Freeman v Home Office [1984] 1 All E.R. 1036. and also C.M. Culver and B. Gert, Philosophy in
Medicine (OUP: New York, 1982), p.SI.
38 Written consent is required in a particular format by certain statutes, e.g., the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 1990.
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practicable. For any procedure that carries a substantial risk the National
Health Service ("NHS") Management Executive recommends that written
consent should be obtained.39
An adult is deemed competent to give a legally effective consent if
he/she is able to understand the nature and purpose of the treatment.40 Plus,
the patient must be "mentally and physically capable ofexercising choice.,,41
The Law Commission identified three different approaches to determining
capacity: status, outcome and function. 42 Now, according to the Mental
Incapacity Bill 2003, currently before Parliament, a person has capacity in
relation to a matter and is, therefore, able to make a decision for himself if
he/she is able (a) "to understand the information relevant to the decision," (b)
"to retain" that information, (c) "to use" that information "as part of the
process of making the decision", and (d) "to communicate the decision
(whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).,,43
In England,44 unlike America, there is no principle of "informed
consent," whereby it is the doctor's duty, "at a minimum," to inform the
patient of "the nature of the proposed treatment, any alternative treatment
procedures and the nature and degree of risks and benefits inherent in
undergoing and abstaining from the proposed treatment.,,45
At present the doctor's only responsibility is to inform the patient of
those risks involved with having or refusing the treatment, which a
reasonable body ofmedical opinion would confirm as acceptable practice.46
Although this stance was confirmed by Lord Diplock in Sidaway,47 Lord
Scarman, delivering a dissenting judgement, accorded with the American
approach. More recently there are indications 48 that the courts will in the
39 BMA Professional Division, Rights and Responsibilities ofDoctors (BMA Publishing Group, 1992).
40 Lord Brandon in F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2All E.R. 545.
41 Re T(Adult;Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam Law 95.
42 Law Commission Report, Mental Capacity, Report No 231, 1995.
43 Clauses I and 2of the Bill.
44 See e.g., Freeman v Home Office [1987] 1All E.R. 1036.
45 Crain v Allison, 443 A. 2d at p.562.
46 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee. (1957) 1W.L.R. 582.
47 Sidaway v Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital And Maudsley Hospital and Others [1985] I
AC 871.
48 See, e.g., judgement of Moorland J. in Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5Med L.R. 334.
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future move towards a true doctrine of informed consent. However, if the
patient specifically asks the doctor to explain the risks, the doctor must
answer truthfully.49
Possible consequences of treating without consent
A person's right to self-determination and autonomy are so highly
respected that he/she may sue for damages for assault or may make a claim
based on negligence ifa doctor treats himlher without consent.50 The medical
profession may unwittingly believe that, so long as they have obtained a
patient's written consent, they will be protected from liability. But, unless a
patient understands the exact nature and purpose ofthe proposed treatment, a
signed consent form is invalid and the patient may still be able to sue.
Patient's capacity to decide
How can a doctor be sure a patient has the capacity to agree or to refuse
to consent to treatment? There are several issues doctors have to be satisfied
about before they can accept a patient's refusal of treatment. Doctors need to
ensure the patient has the capacity to decide, that the patient's decision is a
genuine refusal of the treatment or procedure proposed in those exact
circumstances, that the patient is aware of the consequences of refusal, and
that the decision was the patient's own, not unduly influenced by a third
party.5I If any of these factors raise a doubt that the patient did not have the
capacity to decide, then the doctors may come to the conclusion that the
patient's refusal was not a true refusal. In an emergency situation the doctor
would owe a duty of care to treat the patient in spite of hislher refusal.
However, in a non-urgent situation, the doctor should apply to the court for
assistance. 52
Incompetent adults
A doctor who treats a patient without a legally valid consent may still
49 Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 4Med L Rev 151.
50 See e.g., Mason and McCall, op. cit., p. 219.
51 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam Law 95.
52 Ibid.
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not be liable in an action if he can raise the defence that he acted in the
patient's best interests (i.e., what a reasonable body ofmedical opinion would
regard as being in the patient's best interest), or out of necessity. A patient
may be incompetent due to unconsciousness, confusion, mental disorder, or
the effects of fatigue, shock, pain or drugs. 53 For a mentally disordered
patient, Part 1V of the Mental Health Act 1983 contains provisions
concerning treatment of their mental disorder. For incompetent patients who
are not mentally disordered, a doctor must rely on the common law to
lawfully treat them without consent.
In these situations treatment will be lawful so long as it is in the
patient's best interests, that is, the treatment is necessary to preserve life or
"ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental
health.,,54 For any other proposed treatment which does not fall within the
ambit ofbest interests ofthe patient, e.g., sterilisation, or caesarean section, a
doctor should approach the court for a declaration that in the opinion of the
court the treatment would be in the best interests of the patient, which would
then make the doctor's actions lawfu1.55
Emergency Situation
In an emergency situation, according to the principle of necessity, a
doctor is lawfully able to treat a patient without their consent in what they
believe to be the patient's best interests if the patient "has made no choice
and, when the need for treatment arises, is in no position to make one.,,56 But
there are limitations to the principle ofnecessity in that the medical team can
only give treatment, which is essentially necessary in the circumstances.57 In
these situations it was thought at one time that the doctors could seek the
consent ofa relative following the dictum ofjudge Robinson in Canterbury v
Spence (1972)58 that "even in situations ofthat character where the patient is
unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting the physician should....
attempt to secure a relative's consent if possible". There is, however, no
53 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam Law 95.
54 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) (1989) 2 F.L.R. 376.
55 Ibid.
56 Re T (Adult: Refusal afTreatment) [1993] Fam Law 95.
57 Mason and McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (Butterworths: London, 1994), p. 220.
58 464 F 2d 772, at 789.
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general doctrine that a relative is empowered to give or refuse consent on the
patient's behalf. 59 Any information they give to the doctor may determine
how the doctor should treat his patient. For example, ifthe next ofkin made a
doctor aware that the patient was a Jehovah's Witness but the patient was not
carrying a medical alert card, "he would avoid or postpone any blood
transfusion for as long as possible.,,60
Refusal of Treatment
The traditional view is that a competent adult patient is entitled to
refuse medical treatment for rational or irrational reasons or for no reason.61
Adults can decline medical advice even when the consequences are that they
will die.62 In this country the right of self-determination is regarded as "a
basic human right protected by the common law.,,63 In America this right is
protected by a written Constitution. So highly respected is the patient's
autonomy that the right to be free from unwanted physical invasion is deemed
to include the right to refuse life sustaining care.64 However, as already
mentioned, unlike America, this country does not recognise the concept of
informed refusal. What is required here is that the patient understands the
nature and purpose of the proposed treatment to which consent or refusal is
given. In the event of refusal of consent the British Medical Association
("BMA") recommends that doctors explain the nature ofthe illness in detail,
why the treatment is necessary and possible consequences if treatment is
refused. If the patient continues to refuse, their decision should be
respected.65
Refusal of obstetric intervention
59 Re T (Adult: Refusal ofTreatment) (1992) W.l.R.782 at p.789d.
60 Ibid., p.787.
61 Re T, ante.
62 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 857.
63 Sidaway v Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital and The Maudsley Hospital [1985] 2W.L.R.
480 at 488.
64 Re AC (1990) 573 A2d. 1252 (DC, CAl.
65 See, e.g., BMA Professional Division, Rights and Responsibilities ofDoctors (BMA Publishing Group, 1992),
p.3.
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One of the most controversial and problematic area of health care in
respect ofa patient's refusal to consent to treatment is in obstetrics. Should a
woman be able to decline to consent to medical intervention which the
doctors tell her is essential to prevent serious harm occurring to her baby?
Because of the controversy just mentioned, it is worth giving a brief
account ofsome ofthe cases leading to the present position that the mother's
rights prevail over those of the fetus, as shown by St. George's Healthcare
NHS Trust v S. In Re T 66 Lord Donaldson MR expressly left the question
open as to whether the presence of a viable fetus could override the
fundamental principle that a competent adult patient has the right to accept or
refuse treatment. In that case a pregnant woman was in need of a blood
transfusion to save her life, following the stillbirth ofher baby. She refused
the transfusion on religious grounds, having been brought up by her mother
who was a fervent Jehovah's Witness. Her father, who was opposed to her
beliefs, sought a declaration from the court, that it would be lawful for the
doctors to administer a blood transfusion as she was now unconscious. The
court held that her refusal was invalid because it had been given under duress
from her mother. The Court of Appeal, however, went on to consider the
central issue, that of a competent adult's right to refuse treatment. Lord
Donaldson MR said:
An adult patient who...suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to
choose one rather than another ofthe treatments being offered. The only
possible qualification is where the choice may lead to the death of a
viable foetus. That is not the case here and if and when it arises, the
courts will be presented with a novel problem ofconsiderable legal and
ethical complexity.
Having recognised this limitation, Lord Donaldson gave no indication as
to the legal foundation on which the exception was based. Although the basis
ofhis statement might be drawn from his conclusion, he said that, though an
individual had a right to self-determination, this was to be balanced against
society's interest ofpreserving the sanctity oflife; and that any doubt should
fall in favour of society's interest. This is similar to the society interests
expounded by the American courts.
However, this potential limit to self-determination of pregnant women,
66 [1993] Fam Law 95.
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mooted by Lord Donaldson, was soon put under the spotlight in Re S. 67 That
was the first case brought before an English court in which a declaration was
sought to authorise a caesarean section without lawful consent. The case
became a cause celebre and provoked great debate about the rights and
wrongs of forcing pregnant women to undergo surgical operations against
their wishes. Mrs. S was a 30 year old 'born-again Christian' expecting her
third child. The baby was lying in a transverse position and could not be
born vaginally. The mother refused, on religious grounds, to give consent to
a caesarean section, saying that 'God will provide'. The President of the
Family Division of the High Court granted an order authorising the health
authority to carry out the operation. Both the judge and the Health Authority
contended that they were doing it in the interests of both Mrs S and her
unborn child. The judge, Sir Stephen Brown P, acknowledged that the
fundamental issue of whether a pregnant woman could refuse to have
treatment was left open by Lord Donaldson.68 There was no English
authority for intervention so he based his decision on the American
authority.69 In looking at the American authority he believed that, had the
case been heard in the United States, the courts would have found in favour
of authorising the operation. There were those who in hindsight suggested
that the assumption based on Re AC was correct.70
Insofar as the decision was taken to protect the rights ofthe unborn child,
it would seem to be in direct conflict with the Court of Appeal in Re F.71 In
this case the local authority had made an application to have a schizophrenic
woman, detained in hospital, to undergo a caesarean section and for her baby
to be made a ward of court. The Court of Appeal firmly refused the
application on the grounds that the fetus had no legal identity and could not
be made a ward ofcourt. The court also saw "the case as an attempt to create
a new jurisdiction to protect foetuses by orders which controlled pregnant
women."n The court held that "without Parliamentary authority, English
courts have no jurisdiction to restrict pregnant women's civil liberties in
67 [1992] 4 All E. R. 671.
68 Re T(Adult: Re/usal a/Treatment) (1992) Fam Law 95.
69 Re AC (1990) 573 A2d 1252 (DC, CAl.
70 See e.g., R. Francis, "Compulsory Caesarean Sections: An English Perspective" Journal o/Contemporary Health
Law and Policy 1998, vol. 14: 365, 374.
71 Re F(In Utero) (Wardship) [1988] 2 All E.R. 193
72 Ibid.
54
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
b I . ,,73anyway, even y non- consensua caesarean sectlOns.
It could be argued that the decision of the court was based on the
broader issue ofpublic interest74 or, as Lord Donaldson suggested, "society's
interest.,,75 This approach has been recognised by a number of cases
including Re F and Re T, in which Lord Donaldson suggested that "in case of
doubt, that doubt falls in favour ofthe preservation oflife for ifthe individual
is to override the public interest he must do so in clear terms." Clearly it
would be very tempting for the courts to "come down on the side oflife" but,
in doing so, the judge compromises the state's integrity by acting coercively
albeit in a good cause.76 The judgement of Sir Stephen Brown P was
extremely briefand gave no clues as to which approach he might or might not
have adopted. Suffice to say that the case generated a great deal of interest
and criticism from academics,77 interested groups,78 and feminists,79
prompting the Royal College of Obstetrics ("RCO") to issue guidelines
which suggested that doctors should respect the competent mother's wishes.80
All this was before the Court of Appeal's decision to the contrary in 1998.
In 1996 there was a spate of cases which came before the English
courts requiring declarations authorising caesarean section. In every case it
was declared that the treatment would be lawful. In each case the judge's
decision was based on the fact that the women were incompetent and that the
treatment could be made lawful on the grounds that it was in their best
interests.
Tameside and Glossip Acute Services Trust v CH (1996) 81 involved a
schizophrenic woman who had been detained under the Mental Health Act
1983. Wall J declared that a caesarean section could be performed without
consent as treatment for mental disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983,
73 Ibid.
74 See, e.g., Stern, "Court Ordered Caesarean Sections: In Whose Interest?", MLR, March 1993, vol. 56, n.2, pp.238-
43.
75 See e.g., Lord Donaldson in Re T(Adult: Refusal of Treatment} (1992) Farn Law 95.
76 See, e.g., N.K. Rhoden, "The Judge in the Delivery Room- The Emergence ofCourt Ordered Caesarean Sections."
77 See commentary by Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, "Treatment without Consent," (1993) I Med. Law Rev.92.
78 Such as AIMS and NeT.
79 Barbara Hewson, "Mother Knows Best," (1992) 142 N.L.J., 1538,1545.
80 A Consideration ofthe Law and Ethics in Relation to Court-Authorised Obstetric Intervention, 1996.
81 (1996) 1 F.L.R. 762.
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section 63. In doing so the judge controversially 82manipulated the statute
construing induction oflabour and caesarean section as treatment for mental
disorder. Wall J developed a three-stage test in order to judge a patient's
competence to consent: (a) the capacity to understand and retain the treatment
information, (b) believing it and (c) weighing it to make the choice. Sadly
the woman was in a no-win situation because, although she understood the
information, she did not believe it. So, she failed the test.
It is unclear just how many of these cases have come to court but a
number have followed, two of which came to court on the same day. Both
were heard by the same judge who decided in both instances that the women
were incapable ofmaking a decision about consent. In the first case, Norfolk
and Norwich (NHS) Trust v W, 83 the judge reasoned that the woman "was
making the decision at a time of acute emotional stress and physical pain in
the ordinary course oflabour" and, in the second case, Rochdale NHS Trust v
C,84 that the basis ofthe woman's incompetence to decide was "the emotional
stress of pain and labour." Where does this leave women who are in labour
generally? Does it mean that they are all incapable of making decisions?
Does it mean that the medical team can override a woman's decision just
because of the normal stresses and strains of labour? Clearly women
threatened with court-ordered caesarean section have, as one author
suggested, a number of choices: 'injunct, flee, fight, acquiesce, appeal,
litigate. ,85
The issue was addressed again in Re ME (Adult: Medical Treatmen), 86
where a caesarean section was required to save the life ofthe fetus from death
or serious handicap. The woman involved had a needle phobia and, although
she originally agreed to the operation, once in the anaesthetic room her
needle phobia caused her to panic and subsequently refuse to go through with
the operation. Yet again, the court declared that it would be lawful to provide
the treatment in her own best interests. However, on appeal, the Court of
Appeal, when considering the issue of competence, endorsed the principle
that, where competent, the woman's autonomy must prevail over her own
82 See e.g., Barbara Hewson, 'Women's Rights and Legal Wrongs', (1996) 146 N.L.J. 1385.
83 [1996] 2 FLR 613.
84 [1997] 1 FCR 274, where the judge disregarded evidence from the woman's obstetrician and psychiatrist that
she was in fact competent.
85 See e.g., Barbara Hewson, "Ethical triumph, or surgical rape?" Solicitors Journol, November 1993, p.1183.
86 [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426, CA.
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best interests and those of her fetus. Unfortunately this was only obiter.
Therefore, the whole issue was left to be finally considered in St Georges
Healthcare Trust v S,87 where the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of
Sir Stephen Brown, President ofthe Family Division ofthe High Court, and
concluded that, even when her own life depended on receiving medical
treatment, an adult of sound mind was entitled to refuse it. That right of a
pregnant woman was not diminished merely because her decision to exercise
it would result in the death ofan unborn child. The Court ofAppeal actually
agreed with the reasoning ofthe majority ofthe Supreme Court ofCanada in
Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v DFG88 (a case
concerning solvent abuse by a pregnant woman) that, inter alia, the fetus was
not a legal person and it would be undesirable to create fetal rights to conflict
with maternal rights.
Comment
The striking thing about all the pre-1998 cases mentioned thus far is not
only that all of them were decided in favour ofproceeding with the operation,
but also the fact that they all lacked procedural due process.
The majority of the applications were made ex parte, with the woman
being unrepresented in court. The applications were all made in an
emergency situation under strict time restraints, where the judges had to make
their decisions in a very short period of time, having been presented with a
one-sided argument from the obstetricians involved.
This can be one ofthe few occasions that the courts have been prepared
to make such an important decision as to an individual's rights without a
proper hearing. Why in so many cases were the judges prepared to forego
procedure to save the life ofan unborn child who certainly under English law
has no legal rights?
In the American case ofRe AC the court noted and highlighted the effect of
lack of procedure, stating:
... they undermine the authority of the decisions themselves, posing
serious questions as to whether judges can in the absence of genuine
notice, adequate representation, explicit standards ofproofand rights of
appeal realistically frame principled and useful legal response to the
87 The Times (1998).
88 (1996) 10 WWR Ill.
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dilemma with which they are being confronted." 89
Academics too have expressed their doubts that, given the circumstances
of these cases, judges have been able to "realistically frame principled and
useful legal responses to the dilemma with which they are faced,,,90
The issue of lack of procedure was considered for the first time in an
English court by the Court ofAppeal in Re ME , The case was the first of its
kind to come to an appeal, giving the their Lordships an opportunity to
consider the cases in detail. In delivering their reserve judgement, Butler-
Sloss LJ highlighted that "all the decisions made in the caesarean section
cases ... arose in circumstances ofurgency or extreme urgency ... the evidence
was in general limited in scope and the mother was not always represented."
The Court of Appeal, in making its decision, enunciated a number of useful
procedural guidelines to be followed in caesarean section cases, which have
now been incorporated in the Department of Health Circular.91
In St. Georges NHS Trust v S the Court of Appeal went on to issue
guidelines for medical staff involved in these cases to follow should a patient
refuse consent to medical treatment when there may be doubts about his/her
capacity to consent to or refuse surgery. The court suggested that they could
apply to all medical practitioners and other healthcare professionals.
However, the court went on to stress in its conclusion that in certain,
especially, urgent cases, where delay presented a serious risk to life or health,
"formulaic compliance with the guidelines would be inappropriate,"
In this section has been illustrated the range ofdifferent scenarios where
the accepted principle is that a competent adult has an overwhelming right to
determine what is done to their body. However, although there are clear
exceptions to this rule, the court in Re Twas prepared to add a fourth, that of
protection of an unborn child despite the fact that the fetus has no rights to
protect until it is born.
The courts have now clarified the law in the most controversial area,
namely, that of the right ofa competent woman to determine what is done to
her own body. The courts have offered procedural guidelines for both the
legal and medical professions as to when obstetric treatment cases should be
brought to court and have discouraged unjustified urgent ex parte
89 (1990) Cite 573 A 2d 1235 (DC App. 1990).
90 See e.g., J,Gallagher, "Parental Invasion and Interventions: Whats Wrong With Fetal Rights," (1987) Harvard
Women's L.J. ,949.
91 Departtnent of Health Circular EL, 32 June 1997.
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applications without proper evidence.92
These cases, referred to above, demonstrate some of the strengths and
weaknesses of judge-made law. Judges make new law whenever a case
comes before them. Occasionally they will make radical changes to the law
by the conclusions and decisions they make. Understandably, the judiciary
are driven by a paternalistic desire to save lives unfortunately at the expense
of another person's civil liberties. In this highly emotive and controversial
area, is it not time for Parliament to step in once and for all and resolve the
issue?
Having considered the issue ofconsent and the woman's right to refuse
treatment even ifthat refusal may jeopardise the life ofthe fetus, the rights of
the fetus, if any, will now be looked at. The dilemma for doctors and
midwives caring for a woman in such circumstances is that they see
themselves as having a dual role.93 On the one hand they have an obligation
to the mother and undoubtedly want to respect her wishes. Yet, on the other
hand, they feel they have a professional and moral obligation to protect the
fetus from harm. However, although this dual role is appreciated by the
medical profession, with guidance from the Royal College ofObstetricians,94
the law does not have the same attitude to the problem.
Rights of the Fetus
This part reviews the rights of the fetus from both the American and
English law perspectives, bearing in mind the difference between them and,
in particular, the extent to which American case law has in the past given the
fetus an entity. This American standpoint clearly played an important part in
influencing the High Court's decision in Re 8,95 where the English court
relied on the American authority96 as there was no English authority on the
issue at the time, which led the court to find in favour ofthe fetus. The Court
of Appeal, of course, as already mentioned, reversed this position in 1998.
Before considering the law as regards the fetus, we shall briefly
92 See, e.g., R, Francis QC, "Compulsory Caesarean Sections: An English Perspective", (1998) Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy, vol. 14: 365 at p.386. .
93 See, e.g., Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists' Guidelines, Ethics, No. I, April 1994.
94 Ibid.
95 [1992] 4 All E.R. 671.
96 (1990) Cite 573 A 2d 1235 (DC App. 1990).
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consider the fetus itself, its development and growth from the embryonic
stage of development to the point at which it assumes a human shape and is
known as the fetus. This is because the point at which the fetus becomes
viable has a great deal of significance not only for the pregnant woman but
also for how the law relates to the fetus and its subsequent protection.
It is usual to think of the duration of a pregnancy from the number of
weeks that have elapsed from the first day ofthe last menstrual period. It is,
therefore, generally accepted that the last menstrual period is used as a
baseline to calculate the gestational period of the pregnancy, which is
normally expected to be forty weeks. Conception occurs upon the successful
fertilisation of the female egg (ovum) by a male sperm and denotes the
beginning ofembryonic life. During fertilisation the female egg (ovum) and
the male sperm fuse together to form the zygote or fertilized egg, which,
having travelled through the fallopian tubes, eventually implants itself in the
uterus of the mother, the woman.
By about eight weeks of intra-uterine life, the embryo assumes a
recognisably human form,97 with recognisable human features, as all the
organs are formed although they are functionally grossly immature. At this
stage the word fetus is substituted for that of embryo and from then on the
development and growth of the fetus consists of an increase in both size and
complexity of all its organs.
From the twenty-forth week of pregnancy the organs may be
sufficiently well developed to function and sustain life independent from the
mother. It is at this point that the fetus becomes legally viable, i.e., capable
ofleading a separate existence and, therefore, capable ofbeing an individual
in its own right. It is important to note at this point that, to be viable, the
fetus must be capable of, not only being born alive but also of, being able to
survive outside the womb albeit with some medical assistance. This will
involve care in a well-equipped specialist neo-natal unit which is able to
provide life support, i.e., mechanical ventilation of the lungs, etc., until the
baby is able to support itself. The chances of survival at this period of
gestation is not good but they improve steadily with each succeeding week of
intra-uterine life up to thirty-six weeks of pregnancy.
However, the establishment of the viability of the fetus is a critical
point in a woman's pregnancy both medically and legally. Until such time
the fetus is provided with a measure ofprotection by a number of statutes.
97 See, e,g" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 9th ed, (1985),
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The Offences Against the Persons Act 186198 makes it illegal for a
woman, being with child, to unlawfull/9 administer to herselfany poison or
use any instrument unlawfully with intent to procure a miscarriage. It is also
unlawful for any other person to attempt to cause a miscarriage by similar
means. Section 59 of the Act makes it illegal for anyone to supply a poison
or instrument knowing that it is to be used unlawfully to procure the
miscarriage ofany woman, whether or not she is with child. Section 60 ofthe
Act makes it an offence to conceal the birth of a child.
The unborn child is also specifically protected under the criminal law
by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. This statute makes it an offence
for any person, with intent, to destroy the life of a child, capable of being
born alive, by any wilful act which causes the child to die before it has an
existence independent of its mother. The aim of the Act was to protect the
fetus in the course of delivery.
Moreover, the Abortion Act 1967,100 as amended by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,101 prevents lawful abortion ofafetus
after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy, unless it is determined necessary to
protect the life or health of the mother.
Clearly the criminal law protects the unborn child against acts which
may cause it to suffer harm. The civil law, by means of the Congenital
Disabilities Act 1976, also protects the unborn child against harm caused by
negligent actions to the father or mother which resulted in the child being
born disabled. This right only comes into existence ifthe child is born alive
and survives for at least forty-eight hours. The courts have been reluctant to
recognise the unborn child as having the rights of a person.
Historically, the English legal system has treated the fetus as being an
integral part of the woman carrying it and, therefore, have afforded it no
rights as an entity separate from her. In fact it is an established principle in
English common law that a fetus has no legal rights until it is born and has a
separate existence from its mother. 102 This stance reiterated that made by the
Supreme Court ofAmerica in 1973, which stated "that the unborn have never
98 Section 58.
99 This excludes an abortion legally carried out under the Abortion Act 1967.
100 See, e.g., J. Fortin, "Legal Protection for the Unborn Child", M.L.R~ January 1988, p.62.
101 Section 37.
102 See, e.g., Sir George Baker P in Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service, [1979] QB 276, at 279.
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been recognised as persons in the whole sense.,,103
However, modem legal developments have promoted granting the fetus
increased legal status and protection as it develops towards viability and
eventual birth. In fact a State in America actually has legislation which
provides that "the life ofa human being starts at conception".104
The important issue of viability of the fetus and whether or not it is
entitled to legal protection was acknowledged by the European Commission
when it recognised the fact that it is at the point ofviability that the State has
a legitimate right to protect a potential human life. In Paton v UK 105 it was
stated that "with respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability.,,106
For example, practising Jehovah's Witnesses are strongly opposed to
both surgical abortion and blood transfusions. Therefore, ifa mother were to
need blood before the fetus was viable, she would be more likely to risk her
own life and allow the fetus to abort naturally. However, once the fetus
becomes viable, her wishes to abide by the tenets of her faith in refusing a
transfusion would probably be set aside by the State in the interests of
preserving the life of her unborn child. As the Jehovah's sect was first
established in America and their membership is significantly greater in
America than in England, most of the cases highlighted are American.
American Case Law
In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hospital v Anderson, 107 the first case of
its kind, the plaintiffhospital sought authority from the Chancery Division of
the Supreme Court to administer a blood transfusion to Mrs. Anderson
against her wishes. She was thirty-two weeks pregnant and a practising
Jehovah's Witness. The doctors felt that the need for a blood transfusion was
likely to arise during the pregnancy. They believed that, if this treatment
were to be refused, both Mrs. Anderson and her unborn child would die. The
trial judge felt the judiciary could not intervene, but the superior court
decided that it could grant the order that the blood transfusion could be given
IOJ Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 1973.
104 See, e.g., David W Meyers, The Human Body and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1990). p.4.
105 (1980) 3 E.H.R.R. 408.
106 (1980) 3.E.H.R.R 408 at p.414.
\07 (1964) 201 A.2d 537.
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if necessary, declaring that an unborn child was entitled to the law's
protection.
Although the court identified that the issue of compelling an adult to
undergo treatment for the sake ofan infant was a difficult one, they overcame
the issue of the mother's constitutional right to privacy and freedom of
religion in favour of the child, by stating that it did not require consideration
because the lives and welfare of the mother and baby "were so linked and
intertwined that it would be impracticable to try and distinguish between
them.,,108
Even though the court considered Mrs. Anderson's profound religious
beliefs, they were seemingly unconcerned that they were denying her her
rights in favour of the fetus. Clearly the rights of the unborn child were of
paramount importance.
Some fifteen years later this view was again expressed in Jefferson v
Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 109 where the court considered the
issue whether the unborn child had any legal rights to the protection of the
court. The court, as in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul, 110 considered the matter that,
although the infant was capable of independent life, it was at the time
inseparable from its mother. The court decided to grant an order authorising
the hospital to carry out treatment. The judgement revealed the balancing
exercise the court had to undertake between the rights ofthe mother to refuse
surgery against the right ofher unborn child to live. Again the court felt that
the child's right took precedence.
This case and Raleigh Fitkin-Paul gave a clear indication that the
American courts were prepared to restrict the right ofself-determination ofa
pregnant woman when it imposed a threat to her unborn child and its right to
life. Although the court recognised it was an intrusion on the woman by the
state, such an intrusion was a valid one.
In another American casellI Scrieber Jhighlighted what the courts had
identified as being the State's interests, namely, the preservation of life, the
prevention of suicide,112 the preservation of the ethical integrity of the
medical profession and the protection of dependent third parties. The
108 Ibid. p.538.
109 (1981) Ga.,274 S.E. 2d 457.
110 (1981) 274 SE 2d 457 (Supreme Ct of Georgia).
111 Re Conroy (1985) 486 A2d 1209.
112 Satz v Perlmutter 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1878).
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protection ofdependent third parties restates the principle that the state has a
duty to protect any unborn child and any other child the patient may have.
The crucial question is the weight to be placed on the relevant state interest.
The protection of dependent third parties is very problematic and yet very
relevant to the issue ofcourt-ordered caesarean sections. It is the one that the
judges have used to justify their decisions in order to protect the fetus.
Clearly there are a number of precedents where the State's interest
(otherwise known as society's interest) in protecting innocent third parties 113
has prevailed over the interests ofthe mother. The most significant case was
Re AC, 114 where a caesarean section was ordered on a woman who was
moribund and suffering from terminal cancer in order to save the twenty-six-
week-old fetus. The unfortunate result was that operation failed to save the
child who only lived for two and a halfhours and led to a rapid deterioration
in the mother's condition, resulting in her subsequent death.
However, this case was to prove a turning point in America for the
rights ofthe fetus. The Court ofAppeal reversed the original decision stating
that the pregnant woman's right to refuse treatment will be conclusive and
would outweigh any interests ofthe unborn child. This decision rejected the
argument of the state's interest in protecting the lives of third parties.
However, the court did leave open the possibility that, for "truly
extraordinary or compelling reasons," the parent's right must give way.
In the State ofIllinios v Bricd, 115 the last of the American cases to be
considered here, the court dismissed the State's application for an injunction
to compel Mrs. Bricci to undergo a caesarean section, despite medical
evidence that the fetus had a "close to zero" chance of surviving a vaginal
delivery and a substantial chance of brain damage if it did survive such a
delivery. The court held that the State had "failed to demonstrate that there is
statutory or case-law support justifying the intrusive procedure requested".
Mrs. Bricci subsequently gave birth to an apparently healthy baby boy by
normal vaginal delivery.
English Case Law
Up until 1992 some cases ofthis sort had occurred in England and there
113 See also Mcmillan v State 258 Md. 147, 152.
114 533 A 2d 611 (DC,1987).
115 Filed in the Supreme Court of Illinios on 15th December 1993 Reference No 76560.
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was little evidence to suggest that the courts would follow the approach taken
by the American courts, which was to regard the viable fetus as a person, to
be granted "personhood" status. In Re S (Adult; Refusal ofTreatment/ 16 the
President ofthe Family Division granted a court order for a caesarean section
to be performed on Mrs. S despite her refusal on religious grounds to give her
consent. The judge was influenced by the possible exception identified by
Lord Donaldson in Re T, 117 in which the Court ofAppeal acknowledged that
a patient suffering from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose
whether or not to consent or refuse consent to treatment. This was, however,
qualified in terms of the relative rights of a pregnant woman and her fetus.
The Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, stated that "the only possible
qualification is a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a viable
fetus."
The court in Re S noted that the 'fundamental question' was whether
the right ofthe mentally competent adult to refuse treatment might not apply
where that refusal could lead to the death of a viable fetus. Having decided
that this might be the case, Sir Simon Brown, President of the Family
Division, referred to and followed the American precedent118 that suggested
the order should be granted.
Insofar as the decision was taken to protect the interests of the fetus, it
was in complete conflict with the Court of Appeal decision in Re F, 119 in
which the court, relying heavily on Paton, 120 concluded that the fetus had no
individual personality and that, therefore, could not be made a ward ofcourt.
But, of course, as already mentioned, the Court of Appeal, in 1998, in St.
George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S, held that a pregnant woman of sound
mind has the right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of any moral
repugnancy surrounding her decision; the Court also approved the decision of
the Canadian Supreme Court in Winnipeg that, inter alia, it was undesirable
to create fetal rights that would conflict with maternal rights.
Protecting the rights of the fetus by wardship"
116 [1992] 4 An E.R. 671.
117 [1993] Fam Law 95,102.
118 He ACJ1990) 573 A 201253.
119 [1988] 2 An E.R. 193.
120 Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service TrusteesJl979] QB 276, [1978] 2 An E.R. 987.
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Attempts have been made to use the wardship jurisdiction to protect the
unborn child from harm by limiting the mother's behaviour. 121 This could
involve her being ordered to stop smoking or inhibiting her alcohol intake.
In fact it would be possible to limit any activity that would be hazardous to
the fetus. In D v Berkshire C. c., 122 a case which concerned a baby born with
drug withdrawal symptoms as a direct result of the mother's dependency on
drugs, the House of Lords ruled that the social services were in fact entitled
to take the child into care at birth, because ofthe mother's neglect during the
pregnancy. The court was clearly willing to consider the ante-natal behaviour
ofthe mother and stated that in certain circumstances, the law might properly
concern itself with the appropriate treatment of unborn children. 123
Yet in Re pl24 the use of wardship in order to protect the fetus was
firmly rejected, as it was in the later unreported case, Re p.125 In Re F the
local authority were seeking to make the fetus a ward of court in order to
protect it from its mother who was leading a nomadic existence and who went
missing when the child was due. The court refused to extend the law so as to
"impose control over the mother ofan unborn child, where such control may
be necessary for the benefit of that child.,,126 A similar approach was taken
by the High Court of New Zealand in which the court had to deal with an
application "for authorising a blood transfusion or other medical treatment to
a child as yet unborn but expected to be born almost immediately.,,127 The
order was made authorising the carrying out of the medical treatment to the
child ifborn alive. The judge, as in Re F, expressed "considerable doubt as
to whether or not there was jurisdiction to place an unborn child under the
guardianship of the court."
However, a significantly different view was taken in the American case
ofJefferson v Griffin Spalding County Hospital, 128 where the court held that,
121 See, e.g., N. V. Lowe, "Can You Ward a Fetus", (1987) L.Q.R., vol. 96, p. 772.
122 [1987] 1 All E.R. 20.
123 See, e.g., J. E.S. Fortin, "Legal Protection of the Unborn Child", (1988) MLR, vol. 51, pp.54-83.
124 [1988] 2 All E.R. 193
125 Umeported: a decision ofEwbank. J., 28th March 1988. In which based his decision on that ofRe F. which had
established that "as a matter ofprinciple there is no jurisdiction at the present time in the High Court to make an
unborn child a ward of court."
126 See judgement of Balcombe LJ in Re F [1988] 2 All E.R. 193, at 200-201.
127 Director General ofSocial Welfare v Ulutau (1988) NZFLR 631.
128 (1987) 247 Ga 86, 274 SE 2d 457.
66
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
a fetus ofthirty-nine weeks was a viable human being and, as a matter oflaw,
was entitled to the protection ofthe Juvenile Code ofGeorgia. The Supreme
Court ordered temporary custody ofthe unborn child to the State of Georgia
Human Resources and County Department of the Family and Children
Services, which were granted full authority to act on behalfof the fetus until
such point as the fetus was separated from its mother.
There have been other attempts made to protect the fetus. For example,
in C v Sl29 a father sought to prevent his girlfriend and the local authority
from terminating a pregnancy of 18-21 weeks. The court held that he did not
have any legal standing to prevent the abortion, either as the father or as the
next friend ofthe child. The unborn child also had no locus standi to prevent
the abortion. Helilbron J said that the child's legal right to be a party to an
action "crystallises upon the birth, at which date, and not before, the child
attains the status of a legal person... , and can then exercise a legal right.,,130
The traditional view is that the fetus is not considered to have any
status or rights as a separate legal entity until it has been born. Yet, in some
of the early American cases, the courts were prepared to posit a so called
State's interest in protecting potential but viable fetuses. Concerns to save
the life of a fetus have lead the courts to consider other things such as
wardship. Those concerns have also led the family law courts to mis-
interpret the law, and on occasion manipulate it by way ofthe Mental Health
Act 1983, in favour of the fetus. However, the fact remains that the fetus is
not an independent person with legal rights; therefore, no action can be
brought on its behalf until it is born. Moreover, the courts have recently
confirmed that a pregnant woman has an absolute right to refuse treatment,
even when this may compromise the life of a viable fetus.
Conclusion
This paper has identified the dilemma, both medico-legal and ethical,
concerning the pregnant woman and considered whether or not her refusal of
medical treatment may be judicially overridden either in her interests or those
of the fetus. It has also looked at the history and development of the
caesarean section and focused on a range of different scenarios, where the
accepted principle that competent adults have the absolute right of self
determination (to decide what is done to their body) has first been restricted,
129 [1988] QB 135.
130 Ibid., p.140.
67
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
and later affirmed, by the common law.
In both America and England the courts earlier on tended to authorise
many intrusive surgical procedures on non-consenting pregnant women,
ranging from blood transfusion to the more invasive operation of caesarean
section. However, later on, in America Re AC emphasised patients'
autonomy and self-determination. The English judiciary followed suit when
the Court of Appeal in St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S reversed the
decision of the High Court in Re S. on the issue of court-ordered caesarean
section.
Judges make new law whenever a case comes before them.
Occasionally they will make radical changes to the law by the conclusions
and decisions they make in each individual case. One interesting area is the
court-ordered caesarean section, where a number of high court judges
established a new medico-legal concept, the notion of temporary insanity
caused by pain and stress of labour. Judges have manipulated the law to
enable them to decide that women in labour are not mentally competent to
make decisions. Decisions have also been made in the face of extreme
urgency, with little or no time to examine the complexities of the case. The
majority of such applications were made ex parte, in an emergency under
strict time constraints, with the court being presented with a one-sided
argument. Academics!3! and courts 132 have expressed their concerns as to
whether judges "can in the absence of genuine notice, adequate
representation, explicit standards of proof and right of appeal, realistically
frame principled and useful responses to the dilemma" with which they were
faced.
The Court of Appeal!33 has strongly criticised such action and
reaffirmed some elementary points about declaratory relief, stating that
declarations could not be made on an interim basis, but only after
investigation of the evidence put forward by both sides, that ex parte
applications did not protect medical and midwifery personnel from trespass
claims, and that the declaration did nothing to protect the maternity hospital.
The court also went on to restate the common law principle of
autonomy outlined in the Bland case, and noted that the fetus was human but
not a separate person. The court also acknowledged that "pregnancy
131 see, e.g., J. Gallagher, "Parental Invasions and Interventions: What's wrong with fetal rights?", (1987) 10 Harv
Women LJ, 949.
132 Re A C (1990).
133 St. Georges Healthcare NHS Trust.
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increased the personal responsibilities of a woman" but that it did not
diminish her right to decide whether or not to undergo treatment.
This ruling, although adding clarity to the situation, has arguably done
little to ease the anxieties of doctors and midwives caring for these women,
many of those doctors and midwives feeling that the fetus should be treated
in law as a person and protected, and that it is morally wrong that a mother
should be able to decline treatment that would assist the fetus.
Both the RCOG and the United Kingdom Clinical Council (now
Nursing and Midwifery Council), the governing bodies ofobstetricians and
midwives, respectively, have laid down guidelines to assist the professionals
in the care of such women. The courts, too, have issued guidelines to assist
both the medical and legal professions.
Also, the number of caesarean sections performed has been rising
steadily over the years. Unsurprisingly, the United Kingdom Government
has quite recently announced its intention to allow the section to be
performed, no more on demand by patients but rather, only on medical
grounds.
The moral pressure to act to save or protect life is great, and the
anxieties caused by doing so cannot be underestimated. Is it not time, as
many have argued, for Parliament to step in and put an end to the maternal
rights-fetal rights debate?
Tina Lanning,
Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust
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